
BioMarin is pulling its $2.9 million hemophilia gene therapy Roctavian from the market after failing to find a single buyer. Combined with Pfizer's identical retreat from its own hemophilia gene therapy, it raises a billion-dollar question: can one-time cures ever make money?
Imagine spending over a decade building the world's most advanced cure for a bleeding disorder. You get regulators in Europe and the U.S. to approve it. You price it at $2.9 million per patient. And then almost nobody shows up.
That's the story of Roctavian, BioMarin's gene therapy for severe hemophilia A. On February 23, the company announced it's pulling the drug from the market entirely. Not because it doesn't work. Not because of safety problems. Because BioMarin couldn't even find another company willing to take it off their hands.
This isn't just a BioMarin problem. It might be the clearest signal yet that the gene therapy business model is broken.
Roctavian was supposed to be a landmark. It was the first gene therapy ever approved for adults with severe hemophilia A, a condition where the blood can't clot properly because it lacks a protein called factor VIII. Patients typically need injections multiple times a week, for life. Roctavian offered something revolutionary: a single infusion that delivers a working gene to the liver, teaching the body to produce its own clotting factor.
Europe approved it in August 2022. The FDA followed in June 2023. The science was real.
So what went wrong? The price tag, for starters. At $2.9 million per dose, Roctavian became a negotiation nightmare. Insurance companies weren't convinced the long-term benefits justified writing that check. Patients had doubts too. By August 2024, BioMarin had already narrowed its sales efforts to just three countries: the U.S., Germany, and Italy.
Want to understand how badly Roctavian underperformed? BioMarin's overall revenue hit a record $3.22 billion in 2025, up 13% year over year. Its growth drug Voxzogo (for a bone growth disorder) brought in $927 million alone.
Roctavian? $36 million for the entire year. That's roughly 1% of total revenue for a drug that was supposed to redefine the company's future. The year before, it managed just $26 million.
Think of it like building a luxury penthouse in a neighborhood where nobody can get a mortgage. The product is stunning, but the financial infrastructure to deliver it to customers simply doesn't exist in a functional way.
Bristol Myers Squibb paid $800 million for a cancer drug from a Chinese biotech nobody was watching. It just hit both survival endpoints in the toughest form of breast cancer, marking the first time a bispecific ADC has pulled off that feat. The $8.4 billion bet is starting to look like a bargain.

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BioMarin started looking for a buyer in October 2025, running what it called a "comprehensive divestment effort." No qualified buyer emerged. The company took a $240 million hit in Q4 2025: $119 million in inventory write-offs, $118 million in asset impairments, plus severance and restructuring costs. That charge swung BioMarin from $125 million in net income the prior Q4 to a $47 million loss.
Roctavian will remain available through the end of May 2026 in its three remaining markets. After that, it's done. Patients who already received the therapy will continue to get monitoring and support, and BioMarin says it will honor existing outcomes-based agreements with payers.
If this were just a BioMarin stumble, you could chalk it up to execution. But Pfizer told a nearly identical story with Beqvez, its gene therapy for hemophilia B (the other type of hemophilia). Despite FDA approval in April 2024 and a $3.5 million price tag, Pfizer discontinued Beqvez worldwide. The reason? Not a single patient was dosed commercially. Zero. Pfizer also ended its partnership with Sangamo for a hemophilia A gene therapy in late 2024.
Two major pharma companies. Two approved hemophilia gene therapies. Both pulled from the market. That's not a coincidence; it's a pattern.
Gene therapy sits in a uniquely awkward economic position. The whole point is that you pay once and (hopefully) never need treatment again. That sounds great for patients. For the companies making them and the insurance systems paying for them, it creates a headache that nobody has fully solved.
Traditional drugs generate recurring revenue. Patients refill prescriptions month after month, year after year. A hemophilia patient on standard factor replacement therapy might cost $150,000 to $370,000 per year, every year. Over a lifetime, that adds up to millions. In theory, a one-time $2.9 million cure could save money in the long run.
But payers don't think in lifetimes. They think in budget cycles. Writing a single $2.9 million check requires a leap of faith that the treatment will hold up for decades, and the long-term durability data for gene therapies simply isn't there yet. Even with discounts, uptake was anemic.
The industry has tried creative workarounds: installment payment plans, outcomes-based contracts where manufacturers refund money if the therapy stops working, even five-year payment schedules. None of it has cracked the code at scale.
The pipeline isn't empty. Roche's NXT007 showed encouraging Phase I/II data in late 2025 and is heading into Phase III studies this year, including a head-to-head comparison trial. ASC Therapeutics has ASC618, which uses a different gene therapy approach and claims at least a 10-fold improvement in clotting factor production compared to earlier designs.
There are also non-gene-therapy options gaining traction. Novo Nordisk's Mim8 is a factor VIIIa mimetic (it mimics what the missing protein does without replacing the gene). Centessa Pharmaceuticals has SerpinPC, which takes yet another approach by blocking a protein that breaks down clots. The overall pipeline includes more than 80 companies working on hemophilia treatments across multiple strategies.
The market itself is projected to grow significantly by 2033, with estimates ranging above $21 billion, suggesting investors believe someone will eventually crack the commercial puzzle.
BioMarin is moving on. The company is pivoting toward its pending acquisition of Amicus Therapeutics, expected to close in Q2 2026, which would add Fabry disease therapies to its rare disease portfolio. Traditional enzyme replacement therapies with recurring revenue, in other words. The kind of business model that actually works.
But Roctavian's failure raises a question the entire field needs to reckon with: can one-time curative therapies ever be commercially viable? The science keeps advancing. Clinical results keep improving. Yet the two highest-profile gene therapy launches in hemophilia both ended the same way, with a press release and a write-down.
Somewhere, there's a version of this story where the payment models catch up to the science. Where payers figure out how to budget for cures instead of chronic treatments. Where patients don't have to weigh the miracle of a one-time fix against the uncertainty of whether it'll last.
We're not there yet. And Roctavian's quiet exit from the market is the most expensive reminder we've gotten so far.
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